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From Men and Machines




1 Learning Curves as Emergence of Routines
Learning curves were first discovered in the aerospace industry, where a large
number of items must be assembled with one another in order to build an airplane
[41]. This is possibly not a chance, for it has been observed that the slope of orga-
nizational learning curves is generally more pronounced in assembling operations
(where organizational learning has a prominent role) than in machining operations
(where individual learning has a prominent role) [19] [20]. This insight suggests
that organizational learning curves may stem from the coordination of large sets
of men and machines.
According to this point of view, organizational learning curves reflect a dis-
tributed development of patterns of behavior leading to the emergence of routines
[28] [38], meant as recurrent but flexible patterns of action [31] [32] [12]. Rou-
tines arise spontaneously in both structured environments [11] and informal com-
munities of practice [10] [39] [40] out of repetition of successful coordination
schemes. During their development the sequencing of actions is improved, which
implies that the required task is accomplished earlier.
On the contrary, learning curves disappear if routines are destroyed. For in-
stance, it is known that if production is suspended and subsequently restarted, e.g.
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because of a prolongued strike, production time is generall longer than it used to
be before the interruption [5] [9] [2] [37].
A prototypical example of this vision of organizational learning is Hutchins’
detailed story of the slow emergence of a manual calculation routine among the
crew of a large ship suffering a breakdown that disabled an important piece of
navigational equipment while entering a harbor [23] [24] [25]. By trial and error,
the crew discovered increasingly faster routines until one was found that satis-
fied their particular needs. In the parlance of learning curves, production time
decreased while the crew was exploring the possibilities of available tools, until a
plateau was reached.
In this example, a set of men had to learn to use certain mechanic tools in order
to read the coordinates of the ship by observing reference points on the ground.
Some operations had to be carried out necessarily before others; in other cases,
the sequencing of operations was a matter of convenience. Some members of the
crew had unique abilities to use particular tools; other tools could be easily used
by anyone. Once a pattern of action was established the crew had formed an or-
ganization, whose component units were compounds of people and the tools they
were using. Routines changed with time until and optimal sequence of opera-
tions was found, that were routed onto the organization’s units dependind on their
endowments and expertise.
In general, one may distinguish between the two aspects in the formation of
routines:
1. Given sequences of operations must be routed on a set of organizational
units;
2. A set of operations must be arranged into feasible sequences at the same
time they are routed on a set of organizational units.
Pure routing problems (1) arise when customers, managers, or other actors re-
quire an organization to carry out a certain sequence of operations. Sequencing
problems (2) arise when customers, managers, or other actors require an organiza-
tion to carry out a certain set of operations, no matter in what sequence. Sequenc-
ing involves routing, so it cannot be found in pure form unless each operation can
only be carried out by one single organizational units.
Obviously, reality is made of a mixture of routing and sequencing problems.
Howerver, it make sense to analyze the features of extreme cases in order to un-
derstand reality. We shall see that routing problems (1) are sufficient to generate
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learning curves, but more interesting possibilities arise if sequencing problems (2)
are considered.
In order to disentangle the impacts of routing and sequencing on learning
curves, sequencing will be considered under conditions where routing problems
do not arise. In particular, learning curves arising out of pure routing (case (1)
above) will be analyzed by means of an agent-based simulator in § (sec:routing),
whereas in § (3) a theoretical model will be used in order to understand some fea-
tures of learning curves arising out of pure sequencing problems (case (2) above).
Both in the simulations and in the theoretical model an organization is con-
ceived as a graph. Nodes are its organizational units, edges flows of semi-manufactured
goods, and routines are recurring paths between units. Organizational learning
means striving towards optimal paths of operations through units, which reflects
into decreasing throughput time. In § (4) a possible relation between features of
these organizational units and the slope of the learning curve will be discussed.
2 Learning Curves: Routing
Learning curves arising out of routing problems can be investigated by means
of the java Enterprise Simulator 1 (henceforth jES), an agent-based platform for
the modelization of firms where orders composed by sequences of elementary
operations are routed on a set of organizational units capable of carrying out a
subset of operations each.
In the applications presented henceforth the following assumptions will be
made:
• Orders of given length are random sequences of operations drawn from a
uniform distribution defined over the set of possible operations;
• Orders are routed on organizational units with the criterium that, if two or
more units are able to carry out the required operation, the unit with the
shortest waiting list is chosen;
• The outcomes of accomplished orders are stored in one end unit, which may
represent an inventory of finished products.
This model is able to generate learning curves due to pure routing problems.
Customers, managers or other decision-makers generate orders, that must be routed
on available organizational units in order to be accomplished.
1Freely available at http://web.econ.unito.it/terna/jes under the GNU public license.
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Figure 1: The ratio of actual throughput time to minimum feasible throughput
time. Random orders composed by 10 elementary operations, drawn from a set
of 10 different operations, and routed over 20 organizational units capable of 1
operation each. In figure (a), orders were routed to the unit with the shortest
waiting list. In figure (b), orders were routed randomly. Figures (a) and (b) were
generated with the same random seed.
Even in this simple setting organizational learning can occur, and even if the
single units neither overview the whole process nor remember their own decisions.
In fact, although these units behave according to a rule so simple that it does
not allow for individual learning, the organization learns how to route orders to
decrease throughput time.
Let us first consider simulations where each organizational unit is able to carry
out one single elementary operation. This may be the case, for instance, of work-
ers operating quite simple machines.
Figure (1a) reports the ratio between actual throughput time and minimum
feasible throughput time. This ratio describes a learning curve. Orders were com-
posed by 10 elementary operations, drawn at each step from a set of 10 possible
operations by means of a uniform distribution. These orders were routed over 20
units performing one operation each; thus, each operation could be carried out by
2 units. Although outcomes generally changed with the random seed, the learning
curve illustrated in figure (1a) is quite typical.
Figure (1b) shows the outcome provided by the simulator when orders are
routed randomly, with all parameters and the random seed as in figure (1a). Re-
markably, figure (1b) gives the impression that organizational learning is still tak-
ing place, albeit to a much smaller extent than in the case orders were routed to
the unit with the shortest waiting list. However, this actually occurs because once
sufficiently diverse orders have accumulated, random routing is quite an efficient
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strategy. It is at least questionable whether this effect may be labelled as “organi-
zational learning”.
Figure (2) illustrates four learning curves obtained on organizations endowed
with 10, 20, 30 and 40 units, respectively — figure (2b) is the same as figure (1a).
All curves have been obtained with the same sequence of random orders composed
by 10 elementary operations.
The clearest pattern among learning curves that originate from pure routing is
that they decrease with the number of organizational units. Figure (2) makes clear
that organizational learning is the greater, the more units are available. In fact,
from (a) to (b) and to (c) the plateau is ever smaller.
However, figure (2) also points to the fact that beyond a threshold where many
units stay idle, adding organizational units does not improve the organization’s
throughput time. This can be seen by comparing cases (c) and (d), that are nearly
indistinguishable from one another.
Figure (3) illustrates a similar comparison when the set of possible operations
entails 20 items, i.e., orders are still composed by 10 operations, but these 10
operations are drawn from a set of 20. So in this case there is a higher variety of
orders.
Figures (3a) and (3b) refer to 20 and 40 organizational units, respectively. So
far it regards the number of organizational units, they correspond to figures (2b)
and (2d), respectively.
A comparison between figures (2) and (3) highlights that, so fat it regards
learning curves arising out of pure routing of random orders, only the number of
organizational units matters. In fact, figure (3a) is identical to figure (2b), both
obtained with 20 units; likewise, figure (3b) is identical to figure (2d), and both
have been obtained with 40 units. Variety of orders has no impact.
Since adding organizational units improves the performance of organizational
learning, one may speculate that endowing organizational units with the ability of
performing several operations may produce a similar effect. Figure (4) shows that
this is not the case.
Figure (4) compares figure (2a), reproduced as figure (4a), with a simulation
where each unit was capable of two elementary operations, all else being equal.
The outcome of this simulation is illustrated in figure (4b).
Instead of aiding the task of routing, having more flexible organizational units
may have made things slightly worse. In fact, in figure (4b) the learning curve
never starts to descend, and the plateau is higher than in figure (4a). If the same
comparison is made when 20 units are available, no appreciable difference ap-
pears when units are more flexible. Thus, it appears that increasing the flexibility
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Figure 2: The ratio of actual throughput time to minimum feasible throughput
time. Random orders composed by 10 elementary operations, drawn from a set of
10 different operations, routed to the unit with the shortest waiting list. Figure (a)
originated with 10 units, each devoted to one operation. Figure (b) originated
with 20 units, two for each operation. Figure (c) originated with 30 units, three
for each operation. Figure (d) originated with 40 units, four for each operation.
Figures (a), (b), (c) and (d) were generated with the same random seed.
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Figure 3: The ratio of actual throughput time to minimum feasible throughput
time. Random orders composed by 10 elementary operations, drawn from a set of
20 different operations, routed to the unit with the shortest waiting list. Figure (a)
originated from 20 units, each for a different operation. Figure (b) originated from
40 units, two for each of the 20 operations. Figures (a) and (b) were generated with
the same random seed.
Figure 4: The ratio of actual throughput time to minimum feasible throughput
time. Random orders composed by 10 elementary operations, drawn from a set
of 10 different operations, routed on 10 units with the criterium of the shortest
waiting list. In figure (a), each unit was devoted to a different operation. In
figure (b), each unit was capable of carrying out 2 operations. Figures (a) and (b)
were generated with the same random seed.
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of organizational units has at best no effect, and at worst a negative impact on
organizational learning.
This is possibly due to the fact that, it two or more flexible units carry out the
same operation, some other operation may find no unit able to process it. This
does not occur if 20 units are available, but it may become a problem if — as in
figure (4) — only 10 units are there.
The shape of learning curves originating from pure routing depends very strongly
on random seed, as well as on the number of elementary operations an order is
composed of. The variety obtained by chainging the random seed or the length of
orders is very large, and no clear pattern can be distinguished by changing these
two parameters. Some curves descend smoothly after an initial peak as in fig-
ure (1a), others exhibit several peaks, each followed by a descent, and a few have
a very low initial peak followed by a weak descent. There are also a few instances
where the descending phase never starts, but this occurs only when the peak is
extremely low or inexistent.
On the whole one may conclude that with problems of pure routing organi-
zational learning necessarily sets in if random orders generated queing problems.
The number of available units is the only relevant parameter for this kind of learn-
ing curves.
However, it is remarkable that if the simulator is fed with deterministic orders
— i.e., series of operations that repeat identical to themselves — no learning curve
appears. Real routing problems, and organizational learning, begin when orders
are unpredictable. We shall see that this is a crucial insight in order to understand
the arousal and the slope of learning curves.
3 Learning Curves: Sequencing
Let us consider a situation where the sequence of given elementary operations is
not specified. An organization receives a set of elementary operations to be carried
out and, similarly to the previous case, each operation can only be carried out by
one organizational unit. However, contrary to the previous case, the sequence of
operations is not chosen randomly and obeyed by the units, but it is chosen by the
units themselves. Managers, customers or other actors require a set of operations
to be carried out, but they may not care about the exact sequence. Orders are set
of operations, rather than required sequences of operations. In this case, finding
out optimal sequences is the task the organization has to learn.
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Figure 5: A category (left) and four strings that it can classify (right).
in a sequence, they must be routed onto organizational units. However, by con-
sidering organizations where each operation can only be carried out by one single
unit we can ignore routing and focus on pure sequencing. We shall do so in order
to deal with a problem that is simple and opposite to the one of § (2).
However, even if in this simple setting managers leave organizational units the
freedom to arrange a set of operations in any possible sequence, organizational
units in general do not combine the required operations in any conceivable way.
Technical, legal or administrative constraints generally force organizational units
to work on subsets of all possible sequences. Thus, organizational units must clas-
sify the sequences of operations that they receive, distinguishing those on which
they can carry out their operation, from those on which they cannot operate.
Henceforth, all sequences with an operation at a position such that it can pro-
cessed by a particular unit will be called the set of feasible sequences for that
unit. Organizational units must be endowed with categories in order classify the
sequences proposed by other organizational units as feasible or unfeasible. Only
feasible sequences are accepted and scheduled for processing.
Categories may be coarse or sharp, depending on the ability of a unit to per-
form its operation at various stages or at different stages — e.g., more flexible
machines may not care whether a certain operation has been performed before
they perform their own one. Coarseness of categories will be often referred to as
the flexibility of an organizational unit.
Sequences of operations are strings of integers representing one operation
each. Let us represent categories by means of strings made of the integers used
to represent operations, plus “don’t care” characters #s. A category classifies all
strings having either the same number at the same positions, or whatever number
where the category has a #. Figure (5) illustrates an example.
Here are some assumptions that allow a simple analytic treatment of organi-
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zational learning arising out of sequencing problems:
• Each operation can be carried out by one and only one unit. Consequently,
this is a problem of pure sequencing.
• Each organizational unit has one instance of all categories represented in
the organization.
• Any sequence is feasible for at least one category. Thus, each organizational
unit can accept strings from any other.
• A category has the same probability to process any feasible sequence. Con-
trary to classifier systems, no strength is passed on.
Let N ∈N denote the number of possible elementary operations. Let L ∈N
denote the length of sequences of operations, as well as the length of categories.
Let H ∈ N denote the number of different categories available in the organi-
zation. It is H ≤ (N + 1)L, the number of dispositions with repetition of N + 1
elements (the N operations plus the #) of class L.
Let K ∈N denote the number of different sequences produced in the organi-
zation. It is K ≤ NL, the number of dispositions with repetition of N elements of
class L.
Since categories exist in order to make classifications, it must be H < K. Thus,
H can never reach its upper bound.
Let p denote the probability that a link exists between any two organizational
units. This parameter captures the range of possibilities for changing the produc-
tion routines. In fact, the more possibilities for connecting the stages of produc-
tion, the more possibilities there are for creating new routines.
Links are not established without a purpose. Links represent flows of semi-
finished products through organizational units until an end unit is reached, where
the good is finished. For instance, in the simulations of § (2) there was one single
end unit, representing an inventory of finished products. Thus, searching for better
routines means finding shorter paths to the end unit.
This search is generally not random. In general, it reflects an organization’s
ability to adopt better procedures, discarding the inefficient ones. Let r denote
the probability of eliminating the unproductive links departing from an organiza-
tional unit. Thus, r = 1 corresponds to a perfect decision procedure whereas r = 0
corresponds to a random walk.
10
Huberman et al. derived a learning curve as a function of these parameters
[36] [22]. In its turn, the following model links p and r to observable magnitudes
such as H and K [18] [17].
However, a warning is in order in this respect. Organizational units are com-
pounds of men and machines. Whereas H and K are easily observable so far they
reflect machine features, objective measurement may not be available so far these
magnitudes reflect human features.
Let us consider one single attempt to connect two organizational units. Let
us assume that the probability that a category accepts a sequence is 1/(K− 1).
This is a rough approximation, because (a) there are many more sequences than
elementary operations or units, and (b) a category does not classify all sequences,
but only the feasible ones. However, (a) and (b) push in opposite directions so one
may hope that they nearly cancel one another.
Since each unit owns all categories, the probability to establish at least one





with K−H ≥ 1.
Parameter r represents the probability that the search for better arrangements
is effective. In the limit of infinite attempts to establish connections to other units,
sooner or later the end unit is reached. On the contrary, if novel connections are
no longer tried, the end unit may never be reached because the same connection
to one and the same unit is endlessly repeated.
Let us calculate the probability to get stuck in connecting to a particular unit
again and again. Parameter r will be its complement to one.
Equation (1) expresses the probability that at least one link is established be-
tween any two units during a procedure where H trials are made. The probability
that this happens twice if the whole procedure is carried out twice is (H/(K−1))2.
And so on. If these probabilities are summed it is safe to divide by a coefficient
K−1 in order to ensure that the sum will be less than unity. In the end, the proba-
bility to repeat a connection endlessly is the sum of H/(K−1)2 ∑∞i=0(H/(K−1))i,
which amounts to H/(K−1)(K−H−1).
Consequently, the probability to choose the right path is 1−H/(K− 1)(K−
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Figure 6: Parameters p (solid line) and r (dashed line) for K−H = 2.
with K−H > 1.
Note that eq. (2) is quite a good estimate of r when routines are under con-
struction, but it is definitely wrong once good routines have been established. In
fact, it captures the extent to which organizational units try novel paths, which is
good at the beginning but is bad once a good routine has already been found. It
makes sense in a theoretical model that estimates possible learning curves, but it
would not fit a simulation logic as in § (2).
The implications of equations (1) and (2) become clear if one plots them for
various values of H and K. For obvious reasons, interesting values appear when
the difference K−H is not too small with respect to the absolute values of H and
K.
Equation (1) is defined for K −H ≥ 1 but it is trivial if K −H = 1. Equa-
tion (2) is defined for K−H > 1. Thus, the smallest possible value of K−H is
2. Correspondingly, the range of values of H and K should be close to the origin.
Figure (6) illustrates p and r for H ∈ [1,10] and K ∈ [3,12].
The higher the parameter p, the more attempts are made at improving on the
current arrangement of production. Equivalently, the higher p, the steeper the
learning curve.
Thus, figure (6) shows that the greater the number of operation sequences and
categories, the more possibilities for improvement. In short: the more is there to
learn, the more can be learned.
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However, learning may not proceed if the search for better arrangements of
production is stuck in vicious circles. The parameter r captures the likelihood of
this possibility.
Figure (6) shows that the greater the number of sequences and categories, the
more likely that no improvement will take place at all. To be concise: the more is
there to learn, the more likely that nothing will be learned at all.
Thus, figure (6) illustrates a trade-off between the possibility to improve the
arrangement of an organization and the danger to get lost in endless search. In
fact, the more the possibilities for improvement, the more difficult it is to realize
them.
Let us consider an organization with fewer categories. Fewer categories often
means more generic categories. This means that workers have a wider knowledge
so they can do more diverse jobs, or that machines are more flexible so they can
process a wider range of semi-finished goods, or both.
Let us choose K−H = 3. Figures (7) and (8) show the ensuing effect on p
and r, respectively.
Even with so small a change in the number of categories, differences are im-
pressive. The possibilities for improvement — captured by the parameter p —
have slightly decreased. On the contrary, the likelihood that better arrangements
are found — captured by the parameter r — have increased dramatically. Further-
more, the greater H, the more pronounced are these effects.
Figures (7) and (8) suggest that, by employing a few general categories, a
large gain in effectiveness can be attained at the expense of a small loss on the
possibilities for improvement. An organization of open-minded generalists and
flexible machines may loose a fraction of the learning possibilities afforded by
specialization, but will not get stuck in meaningless routines leading nowhere.
4 Final Discussion
Learning curves would be a valuable tool for business planning, if they were pre-
dictable. The trouble is that this is generally not the case. The slope of the learning
curve is something of a guess, and it may even happen that no decreasing pattern
curve sets in. Given that there is always a small but positive probability that the
learning curve will not set in, it is hard for managers to rely on it in the evaluations
of future costs.
It is obvious that it is necessary to understand the reasons why learning curves
arise in order to be able to predict whether they will not. This chapter moved
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Figure 7: Parameter p when K−H = 2 (thin line) and K−H = 3 (thick line).
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Figure 8: Parameter r when K−H = 2 (thin line) and K−H = 3 (thick line).
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from the idea that organizational learning is grounded on the formation of routines
and attempted to highlight some features on which the shape of learning curves
depends.
In § (2) we found that orders must be produced randomly in order for learning
curves to exist, and that organizational units must be sufficiently many for learn-
ing curves to be effective. In § (3) we found that there must be sufficiently many
things to do for learning curves to set in (large H and large K), and that organiza-
tional units must be sufficiently flexible to enable the formation of routines (large
difference between K and H). Possibly, these findings point to a common pair
of principles for organizational learning to take place, namely, that (i) there are
sufficiently many novel possibilities for conceiving novel routines, and (ii) orga-
nizational units are sufficiently many and sufficiently flexible to implement novel
routines.
Point (i) is exemplified by the case of technical innovations, that quite of-
ten take place at the same time organizational units are striving to develop better
routines [4]. A few cases where innovation was totally absent [6] [13] [33] high-
lighted that without continuous stimulation and injection of novelties the learning
curve reaches a plateau [21] [29] [7] [1]. On the contrary, a changing and stimulat-
ing environment is beneficial to both production time [35] [30] [34] and qualitative
improvements [27].
Point (ii) is exemplified by the fact that, among industrial plants, learning
curves are most pronounced where assembling operations are involved [19] [20].
Assembling operations require a large number of units that must be flexible enough
to interact with one another in multiple configurations, a circumstance that facil-
itates the emergence and modification of routines. On the contrary, plants based
on conveyor belts are not the typical settings where organizational learning curves
arise.
More detailed simulations are in order. It is necessary to integrate all fac-
tors giving rise to organizational learning curves and to investigate their conse-
quences beyond the level allowed by mathematical models, which is only possible
by means of numerical simulations.
The application of concepts derived from numerical simulations to real cases
poses still another kind of problems, for organizational units in general are not
just machines, but compounds of men and machines. The features of machines
can be aesily measured, those of human beings often can not. Human beings exert
a large influence on learning curves, as testified by the fact that the slope of the
learning curve may differ across identical plants of the same firm [8] [42] [13]
[14], or even across shifts in the same plant [3] [15] [2]. These episodes suggest
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that there are some limits to the extent to which learning curves can be managed
and predicted.
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